Overview
A Pandemic may be the best manifestation in digging and
highlighting differences in major countries economic systems’.
When it comes to the economies of the United States and
China which are ideologically different, those differences became very obvious
during the pandemic and soon after it. But the two countries have at least one
thing in common: when this is all over, they will need to rethink their social
contracts.
Different Strategies with different Outcomes
To control and reduce the virus transmission, China and the
US have implemented social-distancing measures, which – together with the
unemployment they produce – have broken the cycle of earning and spending that
sustains global growth. The International Monetary Fund estimates that world
GDP will contract by 3% this year. China’s shrank by 6.8% in the first quarter.
Yet the type of public-health measures pursued – and their
outcomes – have diverged sharply. China’s strong lockdowns produced a dramatic
decline in new cases, whereas America’s delayed and fragmented response allowed
infections – and the death toll – to mount.
This divergence is often attributed to political
differences: Chinese central planning allows for more resolute action. But this
explanation misses the extent to which the US and Chinese growth models have
shaped their responses – and the financial and economic effects.
The USA Model
In the US, decades of neoliberal policies have led to a
dependence on debt-financed consumption. Americans saved little but borrowed a
lot. Thanks to the “exorbitant privilege” afforded by the US dollar’s position
as the leading global reserve currency, so did the government. Fiscal and
current-account deficits swelled.
Inflation, however, remained low, even when the US Federal
Reserve pursued expansionary policies, largely because of the positive supply
shocks produced by the integration of China and other developing countries into
the global economy. The Fed is taking that route again during the pandemic,
slashing interest rates and expanding its balance sheet by more than $2.4
trillion in the past six weeks to prevent a systemic liquidity shortage.
The US financial system has also built up excessive
leverage, while becoming increasingly disconnected from the real economy. Wall
Street firms trade among themselves, rather than serving Main Street.
Corporations rely more on capital markets than on banks.
Moreover, despite advancements in electronic payments,
households and small businesses continue to operate mainly in less efficient
cash, paper checks, and credit cards. The US Treasury is delivering pandemic
stimulus payments through direct deposits and mailed checks.
Technology platforms have capitalized on this debt-driven
growth model, pushing endless consumption by users – through, say, targeted ads
– with less concern for supporting those attempting to generate income online.
The “gig economy” exemplifies this one-way dynamic: a platform like Uber is
optimized for sales and provides workers with the bare minimum of training and
protection, while regulators take a hands-off approach.
It has long been clear that the US model is financially,
environmentally, and – given skyrocketing inequality – socially unsustainable.
But the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that any disruption of the debt-consumption
cycle threatens to trigger collapse almost immediately: as soon as incomes are
interrupted, private financial institutions curtail credit, fearing
non-performing loans. Consumption plummets, depleting incomes further. To stave
off disaster, the Fed and Treasury must step in, shifting credit risks to the
public-sector balance sheet.
The Chinese Model
The Chinese model avoids many of these pitfalls. Beyond high
savings, China has relied on exports and investment, rather than unsustainable
levels of domestic consumption, to fuel growth. Furthermore, innovative
technology platforms – especially in fintech – have linked the traditional
economy with a broadly accessible digital ecosystem that encourages users both
to consume and to earn, thereby boosting the Chinese economy’s structural and
organizational resilience.
These are the results not of central planning, but of
continuous experimentation on the ground and adaptation based on bottom-up
feedback. It was tech platforms, not central planners that developed inclusive
networks that fostered innovation, created new markets, and generated jobs.
Regulators merely facilitated it.
The COVID-19 crisis has underscored the benefits of this
approach. Chinese “super app” ecosystems create sustainable, circular digital
“earn-spend-pay” business models that merge business and consumer functions,
far more broad-based than Western models that are still segmented by sectoral
regulations. During lockdown, Alibaba, Pinduoduo, and other marketplaces became
a lifeline for many small- and micro-business owners, keeping them connected to
millions of domestic and international consumers. Online logistics companies,
such as JD.com, were also critical, as they ensured the delivery of essential
goods throughout the lockdown.
Tencent’s WeChat, a social media platform, enabled people to
stay in touch with their families and friends during the lockdown, while
allowing some creative individuals to earn incomes from blogs and vlogs. Payments
were sent via WeChat Pay. WeChat also enabled the government to relay critical
messages to the public, and facilitated the coordination of complex projects,
such as the delivery of critical medical equipment and supplies. Tencent’s
Meeting app allowed schools to continue operating through online classrooms.
As lockdowns are eased, software installed in WeChat and
Alipay, Alibaba’s online payment platform, is being used to monitor residents’
health and determine where they can go. This is possible because of these
platforms’ reach: one or both of these apps is already installed on nearly
every smartphone in China.
So, on top of the hierarchical traditional banking system,
China has developed a flat, adaptive system connecting 800 million domestic
smartphones in productive ways. This is a crucial element of China’s broader
hybrid-circular savings-consumption-debt-income model, which is more resilient
than the Western model of debt-financed consumption. Indeed, it is a major
reason why China’s financial sector did not confront severe liquidity shortages
that warranted a drastic central-bank response during the economy’s lockdown.
Source: WUAB Research Department – Project Syndicate